What Comes After Post-Anarchism?

  • Posted on: 6 August 2012
  • By: worker

<table><tr><td>From <a href="http://www.continentcontinent.cc/index.php/continent/article/viewArticle... 2.2 (2012): 152&ndash;154</a> - by Duane Rousselle

<p>Levi R. Bryant. <em>The Democracy of Objects</em>. Ann Arbor, MI: Open Humanities Press. 2011.<br /> 316 pp. | ISBN 9781607852049. | $23.99</p><p>For two decades post-anarchism has adopted an epistemological point of departure for its critique of the representative ontologies of classical anarchism. This critique focused on the classical anarchist conceptualization of power as a unitary phenomenon that operated unidirectionally to repress an otherwise creative and benign human essence. Andrew Koch may have inaugurated this trend in 1993 when he wrote his influential paper entitled &ldquo;Post-structuralism and the Epistemological Basis of Anarchism.&rdquo; Koch&rsquo;s paper certainly laid some of the important groundwork for post-anarchism&rsquo;s continual subsumption of ontology beneath the <em>a priori</em> of an epistemological orientation, and his work continues to be cited as an early and important venture into post-anarchist philosophy. The problem is that Koch could not conceive of an anti-essentialist and autonomous ontological system, one not subject to regulation or representation by the human mind. Consequently, he was forced to assert a subjectivist claims-making ego as the foundation of a post-structuralist anarchist politics. Saul Newman was indebted to this heritage insofar as he also posited the ego (extrapolated from the writings of Max Stirner) and the subject (extrapolated from Jacques Lacan&rsquo;s <em>oeuvre</em>) as the paradoxical &lsquo;outside&rsquo; to power and representation. Todd May fell into a similar trap in his book <em>The Political Philosophy of Post-structuralist Anarchism</em> when he wrote that &ldquo;[m]etaphysics [...] partakes of the normativity inhabiting the epistemology that provides its foundations.&rdquo;<sup>1</sup> Whereas Newman&rsquo;s approach did not necessarily foreclose the possibility of metaphysics&mdash;at least to the extent that he began with the subject of the Lacanian tradition (wherein the subject is believed to be radically split between thinking and being)&mdash;May completely foreclosed the possibility of any escape from the reign of the epistemological. There laid the impasse of yesterday&rsquo;s post-anarchism.</p></td><td><img title="Why can't I escape from things I don't even know what they mean?" src="http://anarchistnews.org/files/pictures/2012/caffiene.jpg"></td></tr></t...
<p>This impasse at the heart of the project of post-anarchism has forced Koch, Newman, May, and many others, to come to similar conclusions about the place of ontology in post-anarchist scholarship. The post-anarchists have all formulated a response strikingly similar to Koch&rsquo;s argument that any representative ontology ought to be dismantled and dethroned in favour of &ldquo;a conceptualization of knowledge that is contingent on a plurality of internally consistent <em>episteme</em>.&rdquo;<sup>2</sup> By dismissing all ontologies as suspiciously representative and as incessantly harbouring a dangerous form of essentialism, post-anarchists have overlooked the privilege that they have placed on the human subject, language, and discourse, at the expense of the democracy that the human subject shares with other animals, objects, and beings in the world. This epistemological characterization of post-anarchism has held sway for far too long. It is not by chance that post-anarchism, as a concept, was first formulated by Hakim Bey as an &ldquo;ontological anarchism,&rdquo;<sup>3</sup> and subsequently repressed by the canon of post-anarchist authors. Perhaps Bey&rsquo;s ontological anarchism also lacked the &lsquo;rigour&rsquo; required of today&rsquo;s scholarly audience and for these two reasons (at least) he has received very little credit for his inaugurating efforts into post-anarchism. In any case, I want to challenge this reluctance and revive the roots of post-anarchism.</p> <p>Levi Bryant gives us a reason to believe that we can achieve the promise of Bey&rsquo;s ontological anarchism without sacrificing the scholarly standard of rigour. Levi Bryant&rsquo;s newest open-access book, <em>The Democracy of Objects</em>, is a <em>tour de force</em>. His book challenges post-anarchists to take their radical critique of representation a step further by questioning the &ldquo;hegemony that epistemology currently enjoys in philosophy.&rdquo; Bryant maintains that post-structuralism, and radical anti-humanisms, only appear to reject the subject as the locus of political agency. Their rejection is actually more of a disavowal, a replacement of the human subject with the equally human order of language or discourse. What post-structuralism attempts to elucidate is the manner in which the subject is colonized by the Other of language, discourse and social relations. What here appears as a movement away from the determining subject of humanism and existentialism is only replaced with the determining apparatuses of structures as they are conceived by astute analysts of political culture. Post-structuralism thus re-enters the anthropocentric discourse to the extent that the cultural analyst believes himself capable of conceiving the determinative structures of society. In contradistinction to the claims of post-structuralism and post-anarchism, the role of the ontologist is not to suture the gap between epistemology and the real but to de-suture it, as Bryant puts it: &ldquo;[o]ntology does not tell us <em>what</em> objects exist, but <em>that</em> objects exist, that they are generative mechanisms.&rdquo; Above all else, the role of ontology, for post-anarchists, ought to be a <em>real</em> de-centering of the subject in relation to other objects in the non-human world such that the subject becomes conceived as one object among others within a living democracy of equality. This inevitably leads to the conclusion that objects exist whether or not the subject or analyst is there to represent them: they represent themselves and are autonomous from our dictation, just as each object finds its autonomy in relation to other objects.</p> <p>Ontology must now be distinguished from representation. We must shift the terms of the debate and interrogate the hegemony that epistemology has been afforded within post-anarchist philosophy. At least two possibilities are now permitted. On the one hand, one could intervene into the reigning mode of philosophy, namely epistemology, by latching onto concepts from meta-ethical philosophy. Meta-ethics allows one to easily separate the ontological from the epistemological and to answer very particular questions about each in order to formulate an overarching meta-ethical position.<sup>4</sup> Post-anarchism is particularly adept at this task because of its resounding ability to frame itself as an ethical political philosophy in relation to the strategic political philosophy of classical Marxism. On the other hand, Bryant argues that &ldquo;[p]erhaps the best way to defeat [the privilege currently held by epistemology] is to shift the terms of debate.&rdquo; Shifting the terms of debate is also something that post-anarchists have been very good at doing. Thus, instead of asking the question &lsquo;how do representative ontological systems harbour concealed epistemological orientations toward the political?&rsquo; one might ask &lsquo;<em>do</em> epistemological orientations toward the political always harbour representative and subject-centred ontological systems?&rdquo;</p> <p>The genius of Bryant&rsquo;s book rests in its ability to convincingly argue for the radical autonomy of being and of objects. This claim speaks to some of the most compelling theories of the political in anarchist and marxist political philosophy (for instance, hegemony, representation, democracy, and so on) and it re-stages the political drama of our times across a much wider terrain. The fallacy of strategic political philosophy in the Marxist tradition, as Todd May quite correctly points out, is that it remains committed to a concept of power that is unitary in its analysis, unidirectional in its influence, and utterly repressive in its effect. Similarly, Bryant&rsquo;s ontology allows one to argue that there is a fallacy that occurs &ldquo;whenever one type of entity is treated as the ground or <em>explains</em> all other entities.&rdquo; Whereas May&rsquo;s post-structuralist anarchism moved away from the fallacy of the unitary analysis of power, whereby subjects are constituted by the influence of a single site of power, it nonetheless remained committed to a tactical political philosophy which is monarchical <em>in the final analysis</em>. It remains monarchical to the extent that the human world, the world of epistemology, is treated as the yardstick of democracy. Bryant&rsquo;s argument is quite instructive: &ldquo;[w]hat we thus get is not a <em>democracy</em> of objects or actants where all objects are on equal ontological footing [...] but instead a <em>monarchy</em> of the human in relation to all other beings.&rdquo; The real fallacy is thus not against strategic political philosophy but philosophy itself and the way it has played out over so many centuries. &ldquo;The epistemic fallacy,&rdquo; writes Bryant, &ldquo;consists in the thesis that proper ontological questions can be fully transposed into epistemological questions.&rdquo; The point that Bryant is making relates to the way ontology is today always reduced to an epistemology and thereby loses its significance as a philosophical question.</p> <p>This book should be applauded for its novelty and its thesis ought to be taken seriously by post-anarchists today. Because of this book, and the attendant post-continental movement that is being called &lsquo;speculative realism,&rsquo; we can now distinguish three stages in the life of post-anarchism. First, we can deduce what S&uuml;reyya Evren has described as its &lsquo;introductory period.&rsquo; The introductory period of post-anarchism is defined by its inability to side-step the ontological problem in the literature of classical anarchism. During this period, post-anarchism needed to distinguish itself from classical anarchism while nonetheless remaining committed to its ethical project. The second period overcomes the problem of the separation of post-anarchism from classical anarchism by re-reading the classical tradition as essentially post-anarchistic. Some of the critiques of post-anarchism&mdash;especially that from Cohn &amp; Wilbur<sup>5</sup>&mdash;are included into this period insofar as post-anarchism, for them, was always already anarchism. Whereas the first and second phases have included only explicitly anarchist literature under their rubric of worthwhile investigation, in the third period this no longer holds true. To be certain, the second period permitted the incorporation of post-structuralist literature into post-anarchist discussions (but always with a certain amount of reservation). This third period, the one that is to come&mdash;the one that is already here if only we would heed its call&mdash;will not take such care with attempts at identification or canonization. Indeed, post-anarchism is already here, like a seed beneath the snow, waiting to be discovered. Levi Bryant teaches us that the third period is already here: and yet where is it?</p> <br /><strong> NOTES</strong><br /> 1) Todd May. <em>The Political Philosophy of Post-Structuralist Anarchism</em>. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. 1997. 2.<br /> 2) Andrew Koch. &ldquo;Post-structuralism and the Epistemological Basis of Anarchism&rdquo; [1993] in <em>Post-Anarchism: A Reader</em>. Eds. Duane Rousselle &amp; Sureyyya Evren. London: Pluto Press. 2011. pp. 23-40.<br /> 3) Bey, Hakim. &ldquo;<a title="source" href="http://theanarchistlibrary.org/HTML/Hakim_Bey__Post-Anarchism_Anarchy.html" target="_blank">Post-Anarchism Anarchy</a>.&rdquo; 1987.&nbsp; <br /> 4) I have attempted to do this in my paper on Bataille&rsquo;s post-anarchism; see Duane Rousselle. &ldquo;Georges Bataille&rsquo;s Post-anarchism.&rdquo; <em>Journal of Political Ideologies</em>. 17(3): in press.<br /> 5) Jesse Cohn &amp; Shawn Wilbur. &ldquo;<a title="source" href="http://theanarchistlibrary.org/HTML/Jesse_Cohn_and_Shawn_Wilbur__What_s_... target="_blank">What&rsquo;s Wrong with Post-anarchism?</a>&rdquo; 2010.<br /></div>


Sometimes I actually think the folks that write this shit just don't want people to read their writing. I immediately stop reading anything as soon as it starts talking about "extrapolating from Lacan."

It's work towards his PhD, the target audience is people who are excited when they read "extrapolating from Lacan." It's fine if you don't want to be part of that audience. I don't either. Just saying not everything is (or should be) written for everybody.

Yeah, it's pretty thick but I found it interesting. There was some jackass lurking a few days ago trying to say @news is anti-academic.
I'm not sure what ratio of troll-bait articles to PhD papers the site needs to be considered equal-opportunity but whatever.

Incidentally, I'm a disabled lumpenprole who barely finished highschool and Lacan totally blew my mind a few years ago. I've been extrapolating ever since.

Jackass here! @news is anti-academic!

if Lacan blows your mind then i've got a bridge to sell you

aw come on, it was a few years ago.
That shit about "the lack" being the driving force behind irrational behavior? ... whatever. Fuck you guys!


Q: What Comes After Post-Anarchism?

A: No Anarchism?

Cutting through all the academic jargon they're just discussing the conditions and attitudes that determine mindsets, and how these mindsets create systems and structures.

After post-anarchism come me. It's my time now!

-- Bob Black (pig ffffucker and three prong power adapter)

The conditions and attitudes that reproduce fucking snitches and ppppig fuckers!!

Wait did bob black actually sleep with a cop or is this like DJ being a salmon fucker?

Stop trying to be so clever, sonny boy. When I sign my posts "pig ffffucker" that doesn't mean I like to sleep with cops, even though I am a snitch and damn proud of it. It means exactly what it says: I like to fuck pigs, the four-legged kind.


-- Bob Black (pig ffffucker and owner of a lonely heart)

which is more pathetic: Bob Black - or making fun of Bob Black in 2012?

Well, you responded. What does that tell you? That you're pathetic?

What comes after post-anarchism? If you kissed the right asses, tenure, salary, and faux-radical professor fame.

why are these people against humanism? Anyway it seems they are viewing themselves already as "out of fashion" so who cares already.

What comes after post-anarchist, faux -intellectuals who do that classist thing in which they use academic-posturing jargon to explain things in which they could just as well with how they usually talk. I seriously get the impression that a good amount of people who "write" like this just going to a thesaurus for every tenth word they use. Kind of pointless.

ok, so, i agree with getting rid of the utopian/humanist/liberalist stuff that framed a lot of early anarchism's idealist thinkers.

but so if we have no utopian hopes for humanity, then we start to focus only on the specifics of our own lives, but our individual desires and the things that benefit us personally (our "rational self-interest" to quote some idiots) can often be ultimately negative for a more-anarchist world. especially when you consider that humans tend to operate on short time-span perspectives even for their own self-interest rather than a longer-term perspective. so apply that to the way we determine our collective interests, especially if we get rid of idealist notions of the future, and you can see how we might just all end up being self-interested people like all the schmucks around us.

"especially when you consider that humans tend to operate on short time-span perspectives even for their own self-interest rather than a longer-term perspective."

I wouldn't call 40yr mortgage payments a short time-span, its half a life-span, and the whole Western, nay, Judeo-Christian domestic economic ethos is "utopian/humanist/liberalist stuff" and it's all hierarchical and selfish, if compared to hunter/gatherer mores, which is about instilling values relevant to the specific and immediate desires of the people.

The sentence: "Meta-ethics allows one to easily separate the ontological from the epistemological and to answer very particular questions about each in order to formulate an overarching meta-ethical position." is redundant. A meta-ethical position is already an "overarching" position. That's what 'meta' means.

What comes after "post anarchism"? Reconstructed anarchism? I don't know. What I do know is that we haven't even created anarchism yet, so what's the point of talking about post-anarchism?

OOO = identity politics for objects

My enlightened self-interest demands I feed those around me so they don't eat me. Its a zombie thing.

you had me at "continual subsumption of ontology beneath the a priori of an epistemological orientation"

Obscurantism is, like, totally revolutionary.

Some hipsters in Atlanta certainly think so!

the debate over ‘being’ was at its height at the turn of the 19th/20th centuries stimulated by ‘the uncertainty principle’ and ‘quantum behaviour’ [wave particle duality], and the ‘loose ends’ remain to this day, ‘loose ends’.

the ontology of ernst mach answers a lot of questions that an ‘ontology of objects’ does not. the basic elements in mach’s ontology are ‘sensa’, the elements of sensation; i.e;

“[Mach’s] epistemology postulates "elements" such as individual sounds, temperatures, pressures, spaces, times, and colors. When these elements are considered in relation to one another, they are studied by the physical sciences, and when they are considered in relation to the human mind or rather the nervous system of the human body, they are called "sensations" and are studied by psychology. One of the central theses of Mach's Analysis of Sensations is that the only difference between elements and sensations is the aspect under which they are viewed, and that physics and psychology therefore have the same subject matter. The distinction between the physical and the psychical is entirely a matter of convenience or practicality, because everything is merely a function of these elements. Everything is a mental construct consisting of complexes of sensations. All material things including our own bodies and even the ego are nothing but complexes of elements that have been constructed by the human mind having some fixedness or constancy in sense experience. A fundamental thesis of Mach’s philosophy is that material bodies do not produce sensations, but rather complexes of sensations are associated together by the human mind to produce material bodies.” ---Thomas J. Hickey, ‘History of Twentieth Century Philosophy of Science’

the findings of modern science have suggested that [i.e. our senses have suggested that] ‘everything is connected’ and ‘everything is in flux’. Mach’s philosophy further argues that ‘science’ is ‘the economy of thought’, an approach which seeks to combine the general relationships that our mind extracts from our experience under the most comprehensive/inclusive ‘theory’. Our many observations of how things move can thus be combined in laws such as Newton’s three laws of motion. as Poincaré has pointed out, these formulations do not constitute ‘the physical world’, they are ‘idealizations’ that ‘simulate’ and give a mental-model ‘representation’ of our sensory experience.

our experiments that confirm our theory are dependent upon the same idealizations as our theory; e.g. the existence of ‘objects’ as ‘things-in-themselves’ capable of ‘their own motion’, which as Poincaré says, have no place in a continually transforming relational space [e.g. in a fluid-dynamical world or a world where ‘fields’; i.e. purely relational influence, prevail or 'are the primary physical reality'].

our mainstream science worldview is in terms of ‘what things-in-themselves do’ and that is how we [Western culture indoctrinated minds] ‘see ourselves’; i.e. our biological sciences see ‘the organism’ as a ‘locally existing thing-in-itself’ with its own locally originating, internal-process driven and directed behaviour.

the aboriginal culture, assumes, as does Machean physics with its relational space, that space is one thing, a ‘holodynamic’ that does not ‘bottom out’ in ‘objects’. there is no ontology of objects in the aboriginal worldview, nor is there in the Machean physics view, there are only ‘dynamic forms in the flow’ that ‘appear’ like ‘things-in-themselves’ yet they are included in the purely relational dynamics of space. in this common view ‘man belongs to the earth’, ‘the earth does not belong to man’ [e.g. see ‘Blackfoot Physics by F. David Peat, co-researcher with David Bohm]

the mainstream science view of the world in terms of ‘what things-in-themselves do’ is programmed into humans that are raised in Western civilization. experience has shown that if white european infants are brought up in aboriginal tribal communities, they grow up believing in the essentially Machean physics worldview, and when aboriginal infants are brought up in Western civilization, they grow up believing in a world broken apart into ‘things-in-themselves’ and ‘what things do’.

another way to think of this is to recall from our own experience, that over our lifetime, the world has become a different place; i.e. it has transformed with so many new ‘things’ in it, which have changed our ‘relations’ with one another and the habitat we all share inclusion in.

now, how does ‘what things in themselves do’ deliver or 'add up to' this transforming world of our life experience? the Machean physics view is that ‘it does not’ since transformation is primary physical reality and ‘what things-in-themselves do’ is ‘appearances’ [schroedinger’s ‘schaumkommen’, nietzsche’s Fiktion, Poincaré’s ‘idealization’].

in other words, transformation engenders dynamic forms taken-to-'BE' ‘things-in-themselves’ enabling a re-rendering of relational dynamics in the fragmented terms of ‘what things do’.

the transformation of relational space view does not imply that these dynamic-form-things are emprisoned in a 'deterministic system' since the dynamic forms we call ‘things-in-themselves’ are, like hurricanes in the flow of atmospheric space, participating in the transformation of the space they are included in. hence Mach’s principle; “The dynamics of the inhabitants are conditioning the dynamics of the habitat at the same time as the dynamics of the habitat are conditioning the dynamics of the inhabitants”. the ‘habitat’ and ‘inhabitant’ can thus be seen to have a relationship as in the 'logic of the INCLUDED third’ rather than by the Aristotelian ‘logic of the EXCLUDED third’.

Mach says, in regard to this ‘disconnect’ between our viewing what’s going on ‘around us’ in terms of ‘what things-in-themselves are doing’, and our experiencing of inclusion in a transforming world, that individual perspective of dynamics is ‘psychical’ and does not capture ‘physical dynamics’. that is, our visual sensing is 'perspectival' and brings us a ‘local perspective’ which is conveniently captured using the ‘appearances’ of ‘things-in-themselves’ and ‘what these things do’, but when we are thinking in those visual-sense-perspective terms, we are not, at the same time, thinking of our experience of being included in a continually transforming space.

the example of ‘plate tectonics’ vis a vis ‘earthquakes’ may bring out more clearly this ‘disconnect’ between local visual perspective and our experiencing of global transformation.

the gravitation field is ‘everywhere at the same time’ and the plate tectonics model is one in which the outer mantle is behaving as a fluid and convecting. the ‘currents’ in adjacent convecting cells bump into each other and are either diving down together [seafloor contraction, continents converging] or rising up together [seafloor spreading, continents diverging]. these transformative dynamics are interdependent with the celestial dynamics the earth is included in [i.e. the gravitational field flux]. the notional 'boundary' constituted by 'two plates moving away from one another' and/or 'two plates moving towards one another' is seen as 'appearances' rather than as 'physical reality'; i.e. the 'solid continents' and their movements are like the 'backs of dolphins'; i.e. they represent the exposed surface portion of the circulating cells of mantle. there is nothing in relational space that is 'solid', other than pictures in our mind that come from visual perspective [we are not seeing the whole transforming space].

the 'backs of dolphins' view of continents is reflected in Carlo Rovelli's current work on 'quantum gravity'.

“In Newtonian and special relativistic physics, if we take away the dynamical entities – particles and fields – what remains is space and time. In general relativistic physics, if we take away the dynamical entities, nothing remains. The space and time of Newton and Minkowski are reinterpreted as a configuration of one of the fields, the gravitational field. This implies that physical entities – particles and fields – are not all immersed in space, and moving in time. They do not live on spacetime. They live, so to say, on one another. It is as if we had observed in the ocean many animals living on an island: animals ‘on’ the island. Then we discover that the island itself is in fact a great whale. Not anymore animals on the island, just animals on animals. Similarly, the universe is not made by fields on spacetime; it is made by fields on fields.” — Carlo Rovelli, in ‘Quantum Gravity’

‘the earthquake’ and/or the volcanic eruption is something we, with our mainstream science worldview, capture in terms of ‘what things-in-themselves do’ such as ‘what the two opposing plates on the local San Andreas fault ‘do’ as ‘thing-in-themselves’. if we lived in San Francisco at the time of the great earthquake of 1906, it would be no surprise that everyone agreed that what was going on was ‘local’ and that San Francisco and the people of San Francisco ‘were the only things affected’. This is clearly ‘Fiktion’. the earthquake is merely a punctuation mark in the continuing course of the earth’s transformation.

in 'systems sciences' terms, the ‘earthquake as a dynamic system’ is in turn included in a dynamic suprasystem, the transforming relational space. The fields of tension (gravity etc. are everywhere at the same time and material dynamics operate 'inside of the relational field-dynamics; e.g. the dance of the iron filings is shaping the dance of the relationally transforming e/m and gravity field, at the same time as the dance of the relationally transforming e/m and gravity field is shaping the dance of the iron filings.

viewing the earthquake as a ‘local event’ is convenient, however it represents the same general ‘disconnect’ that applies between mainstream science [the physics is still Newtonian and dynamics are in terms of ‘what things-in-themselves-do’], and Machean science [the physics is in terms of transformation of spatial-relations]. In order to ‘separate’ a local dynamic from the One dynamic of the transforming relational spatial-plenum, we mentally impose an absolute reference frame over it and make measurements of the 'dynamic event' relative to the absolute fixed reference frame.

The lat/long grid is an example; e.g. we can notionally isolate a global phenomenon like a convection cell in the transforming relational space of the atmosphere by some salient aspect of its dynamic such as the ‘eye’ of the convection cell, and then use the grid to measure the radial extent of ‘ITS’ dynamic influence; i.e. with the help of a idealized grid we reduce an unbounded relational dynamic to a local dynamic and impute a local animative sourcing mechanism [the slippage across opposing fault planes conceived of as ‘things-in-themselves’].

now that the notional 'local' dynamic event is not being shaped by its inclusion in a web of spatial relations, it is forced to be mentally considered to be 'changing all by itself'. this is where we are forced to invent 'time' to re-render the change that is coming from its spatial relations, as 'the thing changing', leading to the notion that 'the thing' has a 'developmental life cycle' so that it is seen as passing through a succession of states which can be 'strobed' by the blinking on and off of the sun (days)or by the rheostatic variance of illumination from the moon [of course both sunlight and moonlight cycles are bound up in the spatial transformation as well, but not the numbers on the calendar and on the clock which are regarded as 'absolute measures' that can run, like the number system, from zero to infinity, and where the difference between successive numbers is exactly, and always, the same.

in the case of acculturated worldviews, the Machean physics view, which is the same as the aboriginal view, is in terms of our inclusion in a transforming relational space [‘man belongs to the earth’ (i.e. to the relationally transforming spatial-plenum)], while the Western ‘what things-in-themselves do’ based world view is grounded in ‘appearances’ based on ‘idealizations’ (based on reducing global dynamics with the metaphysical tools of absolute space and absolute time) upon which dependently rests ‘the ontology of local, independently-existing objects’ [e.g. the two opposing faces of a ‘fault’ or the boundary between 'hot' and 'cold' fronts]. this is a bit of narcissism wherein the concept of a boundary and the concept of ‘two things’ are mutually defining. it is a tautological structure, a Fiktional underpinning for an ‘object ontology’.

the ego grows out of the view of ‘self’ as one of those ‘things-in-themselves’ that ‘do stuff’, where the buck stops and starts from one’s ‘internal processes’. you feel great if you identify yourself as the first-cause source of ‘getting lots of stuff done’ [killing bugs with DDT, milling lumber etc.] and you fill shitty if you are not ‘getting lots of stuff done’ [you get paid and respected for 'what you get done'], and if you don’t think about yourself in that mainstream science ‘what things-in-themselves do’ way, the rest of the Western culture is going to see you that way anyhow.

so, in that sense of how people judge you, it doesn’t matter if there is a broader view of dynamics (Machean) wherein your assertive actions vis a vis the accommodating influence of the relational space you are situationally included in are in conjugate relation, meaning that ‘the stuff you get done’ is not first-cause determined by you, but is the conjugate-relating of outside-inward accommodating influence [how nurturing is the space or the web of spatial relations you are situationally included in] and inside-outward sprouting of assertive potentialities.

‘Genesis’ or ‘genetics’ IS NOT ENOUGH to describe dynamics. we are NOT PHYSICALLY-REALLY ‘things-in-themselves’ doing stuff in an absolute fixed empty and infinite space and time reference frame. ‘Epigenesis’, the enabling/nurturing condition of the habitat we are included in, and genesis, the sprouting of our assertive potentialities are not TWO DYNAMICS but ONE DYNAMIC; i.e. transformation of relational space. The hurricane grows by feeding on thermal energy nurturance in the space it is included in [it is the energy-charged space it is feeding on]. The ‘genesis’ of a hurricane in the one-sided terms of ‘a thing-in-itself’ and ‘what it is doing’ is nothing other than ‘appearances’, ‘Fiktion’, ‘schaumkommen’.

In order to localize the dynamic forms that arise within an unbounded relational space, such as the hurricane, we speak of the ‘collision of a warm front and a cold front’ [or cold and warm layers] implying two ‘things-in-themselves’ and a ‘boundary’ instead of acknowledging the transformation of relational space which is the physical reality. Then, as in the case of the earthquake, we invent a NOTIONAL ‘local genetic/causal source’ for the dynamic ‘thing-in-itself’ called an ‘earthquake’ or ‘hurricane’, to provide a point where 'the buck stops' so that we don't have to track back the animative sourcing indefinitely.

As Mach says, this reduction to local causation is psychical, not physical. ‘Physical’ is what everyone is experiencing at the same time, the transformation of the relational space we are all included in;

“That which is given to all in common we call the ‘physical’; that which is directly given only to one we call the ‘psychical’. That which is given only to one can also be called the ‘ego’ [ich].” – Ernst Mach, ‘The Guiding Principles of My Scientific Theory of Knowledge’.

many of us are tired of keeping up this Fiktional pretence, that reality is in terms of ‘what things-in-themselves do’ which leads directly to social hierarchy where people are judged on the basis of ‘how much they do’ as if it is them that is doing it; e.g. the Fiktion; ‘that man has the force of a hurricane with tremendous powers of making things happen’. instead of the physical reality; ‘that man’s rise to power is from his being fed by [or predatorially feeding on] the nurturant energies of the space he is included in. how can it be that he or his corporate enterprise gets attribution as high achievers in terms of 'what things-in-themselves do', when the employee at the bottom who works his ass off is a guy who 'never really amounted to much'?

the commander of the army is a powerful man because the footsoldiers are ready to kill themselves to get the bosses work done. what is remembered is 'the boss got the job done'.

an 'ontology of objects' is what is keeping us trapped in this Fiktion.

you don't know shit about physics.

come on, hit me with your best shot! ... is that it?

"Ontology must now be distinguished from representation. We must shift the terms of the debate and interrogate the hegemony that epistemology has been afforded within post-anarchist philosophy."


I'd like to interrogate Winona Ryder's hegemony.

WTFG!1! poeples like tjhe fuckjinm likes ofg me comer afgter fuckin anarcxhism cos wer just flowin wid teh nfuckin harmonmy of just lettin it all go no fuckin rules no fuckin bustying our fuckinm brains wourkin out whaty a fuckjin foucolty fuckjin epissteem is,,,anD teh reeal fuckin anasrchisty just cruise around no fuckin timetable or fuckin weorkj to fuckin evbry fuckimn person they fuckin needs willll be providfed an thererw s no fuckjin dramas bout where tejh fuckin nexty meal com,es from cos THERRES NO FUCKJIN CAPOP GREED an theres always nuff to go around or we fuckimn take ity,,,AND yous got fuckinm millionmair and popeples fuckimn starvin how come the statuter of fuckin libetry holdimn a fuckinhg svcales i asdk yous d,.,.8ball

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