From Anarchist Perspective
January 8, 2026
Day 11 (January 8, 2026)
The uprising has entered its eleventh day and has not yet died down. The people are not only defending themselves, but in many places they have taken the initiative and pushed back the forces of repression. This persistence has put the regime on the defensive, and signs of fatigue and inefficiency have become apparent in the structure of repression.
Key Situations Today:
Temporary Street Control and Repression Forces Retreat in Major Cities
Tehran; Rasht, Shiraz, Mashhad, and Kerman were the main centers of conflict. In Rasht, people took over parts of the central bazaar and streets for hours, marched, and directly confronted plainclothes forces
. Videos show some officers fleeing. In Shiraz, roadblocks were created in more than 25 locations by burning tires and barricades, and repression forces retreated several times. Mashhad (areas such as Koy Amir and Tabarsi) witnessed hand-to-hand fighting; people destroyed Basij motorbikes and equipment, and some areas were out of regime control. In Kerman, barricades were set up in Azadi Square and Abnos Street, and a lack of equipment (use of private motorbikes and inadequate body armor) forced repression forces to retreat. In Tehran, the Tehran Bazaar and other public markets in Tehran were on full strike, and clashes with repression forces were reported in some locations. These situations show that people have switched from defense to offense and the regime is no longer able to maintain complete control in urban centers.
Spread to small towns and peripheral areas under tight control:
Mehran (Ilam), Lordegan, Aligudarz, Gilangharb, Sarabeleh, Khorramdareh (Zanjan) and were from places that had previously had little or no history of activity. In Mehran, a small town with no political history, people took to the streets and chanted direct slogans against the entire regime. In Lordegan, the clashes led to direct shooting, but the people did not back down and temporarily controlled parts. This joining of small towns, which are usually under tight control, shows the depth of the crisis: the regime no longer has a safe haven inside and anger has spilled over to the remote layers.
Shooting with military weapons was reported in Lordegan and Aligudarz, tear gas and shotguns were used in Kermanshah, and the internet was cut off in Abdanan to keep the campaign hidden. Attacks on hospitals to detain the wounded and threaten families also continued. However, repeated retreats, lack of equipment, and sporadic reports of non-intervention by some regular police forces indicate fatigue and the possibility of internal divisions.
A more coherent analysis of the protests:
The fact that the uprising has lasted more than eleven days is itself a sign of a fundamental change. In previous uprisings, the regime was able to break the tide with rapid and focused repression, but this time the geographical dispersion and tactical diversity (from strikes to direct clashes) have not allowed for full control. With each passing day, the cost of repression for the regime is becoming heavier; not only in human terms, but also in terms of legitimacy and internal cohesion. What we see is spontaneous and horizontal resistance; decisions are made locally and without the need for central orders. Young people block the street, ordinary people build barricades with improvised barriers, and in small towns without precedent, initial nuclei are forming. This scattered structure has confused the regime: when forces are sent to one city, other cities are in flames. The people have learned from previous experiences, collective defense, attacking private clothes, and maintaining the initiative. The regime’s approach is ambivalent and chaotic. At first, attempts to separate the protestor from the rioter and the promise of an investigation quickly turned to direct shooting and the cutting of communications. This rapid shift stems not from power but from fear: fear of expanding popular control, fear of joining new layers, and fear that less repression means losing the streets. Signs of weakness (local retreat, lack of equipment, and reports of attacks on ideological symbols such as seminaries) indicate that the structure of repression is no longer functioning as a single entity. The joining of small, peripheral cities is a turning point. These areas were previously silent because control was tighter and access was less, but now public anger has broken through borders. When a city like Mehran (closed and unprecedented) starts to move, it means that the regime has lost its influence deep within society. This expansion has the potential to transform the uprising into a real process of power transfer from below: each day of resistance strengthens the collective will and weakens the regime.
This uprising is no longer temporary; it is an ongoing process, with the people moving forward with each retreat of the regime. As long as this fragmented but connected will is maintained, the regime will remain on the defensive, and the possibility of larger cracks in the power structure will increase. Continuing on this path will make the cost of maintaining the status quo unbearable for the regime.
Day 10
Today was the tenth day of protests and strikes in Iran, during which 285 gatherings were held in 92 cities across 27 provinces. According to reports, at least 2,076 people have been arrested and 35 protesters have been killed.
Today, as gold and foreign exchange prices hit a new record, protests in Tehran’s bazaar began with a call from merchants, and shopkeepers from various walks of life went on strike and held protest rallies in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar, Topkhaneh Square, and surrounding streets (such as Jomhuri, Saadi, Sepahsalar, and Hassanabad). The repression force used unbridled violence to control the crowd, and in addition to beatings, firing tear gas in the streets and metro stations, firing bullets and sound bombs directly at the protesters, and arresting them, it also attacked Sina Hospital. However, the large crowds of protesters pushed back the security forces in some places. Haft-e-Tir Square and the Narmak neighborhood were also among the centers of today’s gatherings of Tehran’s people.
In Mashhad, market vendors went on strike on 17 Shahrivar and Fallahi streets, and reports indicated clashes with security forces and the firing of tear gas.
Gatherings were reported in Yazdanshahr, Malekshahr, and Najafabad, where merchants were on strike and clashes with the repressive forces were mentioned.
In Shahrekord, along with the shopkeepers' strike and protest rallies, the people's resistance to the tools of repression was stunning; in a video, we see a lone female protester resisting security forces and a water cannon.
The people of Abdanan today, with a massive and united rally, pushed back the forces of repression and control of the city effectively fell into the hands of the protesters. They created epic scenes by destroying the apparatus of repression and attacking a chain store owned by the IRGC. The latest reports indicate that water and electricity have been cut off and reinforcements have been sent to suppress and control these areas.
Malekshahi heroes also turned the funeral of the previous days' dead into a passionate and crowded protest rally. Families of the arrested protesters also gathered in front of the governor's office and protested.
In many other cities, such as Shiraz (Lapui), Tabriz, Karaj, Yasuj, Babol (Babol Noshirvani University), Torbat Heydariyeh and Borujerd, nationwide protests were underway, and a heavy security atmosphere prevails in many other cities, but the protests continue and the protesters are preparing themselves for the call in the following days.
Overall, today we witnessed the fire of the popular uprising growing stronger, as despite the intensification of street repression and disruption of the internet, they continue to fight in the hope of victory. Considering the calls that have been issued, it is expected that the protests will spread further in the coming days.
Day 9
On the ninth day of nationwide protests, activities continued in more than 222 locations across 26 provinces of Iran. Confirmed reports from various sources, including human rights organizations and international media, indicate night-time rallies, limited but intense clashes in some locations, a widespread business strike, and direct anti-government slogans. By this evening, the death toll since the movement began has reached at least 25 people, with reports of at least three children killed and the widespread arrest of more than 40 citizens under the age of 18. Hundreds more have also been injured, and arrests are estimated to be in the thousands.
Reports from some areas:
Tehran: Gatherings continued in neighborhoods such as Narmak, Haft-e-Hoz, Nazi-Abad, Jomhuri, the Grand Bazaar and around the Alaeddin Passage. Security forces responded with tear gas and batons, and the passages remained semi-active. The strike of marketers in the capital’s commercial centers was sustained, with reports of protesters throwing stones and Molotov cocktails.
Isfahan (Khomeinishahr, Foladshahr, Kushk, Arqauz): Heavy clashes with the use of Molotov cocktails against security forces were reported. Businessmen went on strike and women played an active role in the gatherings.
Yasuj (Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad):
Intense street clashes continued with protesters resisting with stones and cocktails. The slogan “freedom, freedom” was dominant, and tension remained until late at night.
Kermanshah and Ilam (Sonqor, Keliai, Malekshahi, Bampour): Large gatherings were accompanied by direct fire of shotgun pellets, tear gas, and even live ammunition. People stood their ground and chanted "Death to Khamenei" and "Death to the dictator.
" Mazandaran (Sari): Nighttime gatherings continued with harsh slogans. There were reports of protesters being rescued from the hands of the repression forces and drones or helicopters flying for surveillance.
Birjand and Shiraz: Student gatherings were held with slogans such as "I will kill the one my brother killed" and "This year is the year of my home," Seyyed Ali was overthrown.
Other locations (Qazvin, Fardis Karaj, Behbahan, Meshkan Fars, Islamabad West, Zahedan, Bandar Abbas and smaller cities): The spread to peripheral areas and smaller cities continued, with initial nuclei of protest, burning of government property and direct slogans against the regime's leader. In some locations such as Lordegan and Kohdasht, funerals of the dead turned into anti-government rallies.
Internet situation and digital control:
Internet disruption reached its peak that night and was highly regional and targeted. Global data (such as Cloudflare Radar) shows a 30-40% drop in traffic compared to normal days, with a focus on slowdowns in tense areas such as Tehran, Isfahan, Kermanshah, Ilam and Mashhad. Messages take hours to send, access to social media is limited and many VPNs are down. This tactic has disrupted protesters’ coordination and severely delayed the release of images, but it has also increased public anger at the restrictions and driven people to alternative methods (such as local communication).
Overall Analysis:
This night shows the protest movement in a phase of scattered but deep stability. The protests have ranged from purely economic demands (such as the high cost of currency and livelihoods) to outright denial of the regime and have involved diverse social strata (from businessmen, students, women and workers to ordinary citizens in small towns). The spread to more than 222 locations in 26 provinces confirms the depth of the dissatisfaction accumulated from years of economic pressure, political repression and distrust. The regime is trying to manage the crisis by combining physical repression (tear gas, shotguns, bullets, entering hospitals) and digital (targeted internet slowdowns), but these methods only buy time and increase the cost of the movement without solving the root causes of the problems; such as sanctions, inflation and economic inefficiency.
The brutal repression with direct fire of live ammunition, the killing and arrest of children and adolescents, attacks on hospitals and the kidnapping of the bodies of the dead and injured protesters has fueled public anger and made the movement more radical. The continued strikes in the markets and the wide geographical dispersion show that the regime’s current tools are not sufficient for full containment.
Families of detained teenagers under 20 in Yazdanshahr have announced that they will join the protests themselves if their children are not released within the next 24 hours.
The movement survives and shows signs of local organizing (such as resistance in hospitals and rescuing protesters), but for sustainable expansion it needs to circumvent digital restrictions and strengthen decentralized coordination. The coming nights will be decisive: intensifying repression could further accumulate anger and lead to a larger explosion, or the restrictions could push people to more creative ways.
The regime is on the defensive and there are signs of internal concern (such as possible escape plans).
The situation remains tense and there is the potential for fundamental change, but the cost to the people will be high, but it will result in the destruction of the regime.
Day 8
The protests had entered their eighth consecutive day. The presence of protesters was widespread, spreading to more than 175 locations in 25 provinces and 60 cities.
This movement is no longer just an economic protest; it has become a scattered and decentralized uprising that puts the regime on the real defensive. Small, local protest nuclei operate without any central command: they form quickly, disperse, regroup, and hold the space. This dispersion is precisely its anarchist strength; the regime cannot target a single front, because there is none. People build barricades with their bare hands, defend the hospital, rescue the wounded from the forces of repression, and sometimes take the weapons of the Basij. These are direct and horizontal actions that neutralize state power and show that control is possible from below, not from above.
Tehran: Dispersion of cores and local control in the eastern and southern areas (Narmak, Haft-e-Houdh, Tehran-Pars, Al-Ghadir, Nazi-Abad, Molavi, Jomhuri, Hafez, Alaeddin Passage) Nightly gatherings with roadblocks and direct clashes continued. Uniformed forces attacked with sound bombs and tear gas, but protesters re-formed cores. Regime checkpoints and the movement of motorcyclists with hidden license plates failed to control the atmosphere. The marketers’ strike inflicted a continuous economic blow. There is no visible hierarchical structure here; local groups decide and act based on the needs of the moment, without the need for orders from outside.
Western Iran: The collective defense and initial armed resistance
of Ilam (Malkshahi, Sarabeleh) was the most intense. On January 12-14, 1404, the city of Malekshahi in Ilam Province became one of the focal points of violent repression during the nationwide protests. The protesters, who were mostly ordinary citizens and without any central organization, gathered in the streets to raise their voices against the economic pressures and the regime’s pervasive control. On the afternoon of January 13, as a group of them spontaneously passed in front of a Basij base, the Revolutionary Guards opened fire on them with military weapons without prior warning. Reports indicate that the commander of the Malekshahi city Guards personally initiated the shooting and killing of the protesters by sitting behind a machine gun. This direct shooting, part of the regime’s repeated pattern of maintaining authority from the top down, killed at least four people (Reza Azimzadeh, Mehdi Emamipour, Farez Aghamohammadi, and Mohammad Bezouneh) and injured more than thirty, many in critical condition. The regime’s action was not only an attempt to disperse the gathering but also to nip any potential horizontal resistance in the bud, but the violence only served to fuel local anger.
On Sunday, January 4, the angry people of Malekshahi, Ilam, took to the streets again and clashed with the repressive forces.
In a completely self-organized response, without relying on hierarchy or external leadership, the people of Malekshahi acted quickly: they transported the wounded to the hospital in their own vehicles, gathered in front of medical centers to prevent the security forces from storming them, and returned to the streets the next day for the funerals of the dead. This direct solidarity was rooted in local relationships and a rejection of any imposed authority; they supported each other without the need for orders from above, demonstrating that real resistance can come from horizontal, everyday cooperation among people, not from power-centered structures. This experience revealed the depth of the regime’s fragility in the face of such spontaneous dynamics.
Reports also narrate that near the Keshvari underpass and 22 Bahman Square, protesters took up defensive positions and when security forces stormed Imam Khomeini Hospital to steal bodies and the wounded, they closed the doors, blocked entry with stones and objects, and in some cases even disarmed the Basij.
South and the margins: Horizontal expansion to unexpected places in Fars (Neyriz, Marvdasht) resulted in direct shootings killing people like Amir Mohammad Kohkan. Lorestan saw the deaths of teenagers. Shalamzar held the space. Zabol (a city with a history of heavy anti-Pahlavi repression) entered for the first time. This expansion to small, peripheral cities (Lahijan, Sari, Noorabad Mamasani) shows true radicalism: protest grows from local pressure and horizontal solidarity, not from a central ideology or external call. People act without a prior plan, based on shared dissatisfaction.
A more coherent analysis of the popular protests:
These have no official party, leader, or program. Local cells operate on the basis of mutual trust and direct action: defending the hospital, building barricades, rescuing detainees. This fragmentation renders state power meaningless; the regime responds with gunfire, grenades, and raids on medical facilities, but it cannot cover all areas at once. The deaths (at least 19-25 to date, mostly in the west) are costly, but the resistance continues because people have nothing to lose and have experienced local control.
The regime is in a survival position: limited internet, heavy presence, but inability to predict. Reports of protests spreading to Zabol prove that the discontent goes beyond old ideologies and acts directly against central control. If the cores become more interconnected (not through leadership, but through practical solidarity), the regime will face a real crisis of control: attack from all sides, with no targetable center.
This situation has real potential for change, as it is built on a foundation of rejection of hierarchy and horizontal action. The situation is fluid and could escalate at any moment. Information is based on field reports as of midnight on January 4.
Day 7
This uprising, now in its seventh day, is not just an economic protest, but a practical rebellion against the entire logic of state power. People have disrupted control of the streets, destroyed symbols of repression, and stood up to bullets. This is precisely anarchy in action: the paralyzing of the state machine from below, without the need for an immediate replacement with new power.
The regime responded with direct fire, raids on hospitals, and mass arrests, but this repression not only failed but also deepened internal divisions: troops retreated in numerous places, officers were captured, and the people successfully resisted in defense of the wounded. Dispersed and floating tactics (neighborhood barricades, burning cars, smashing cameras, and blocking dispatch routes) shifted power from the center to the periphery and created a space for real self-management: mass blood donations, defense of hospitals, and direct dissemination of information without intermediaries.
Izeh (Khuzestan): The killing of Ismail Qoreshundi and the scene of his mother mourning over his body. This is not only an individual tragedy, but also the transformation of mourning into collective action. In horizontal structures, such moments transform private anger into sustainable fuel for resistance, leading directly to the spread of conflict in marginal areas without the need for leadership.
Narmak (Tehran): A young protester who chanted "Death to the dictator" even after being arrested. This act makes the boundaries of control meaningless: repression is not the end, but the continuation of resistance under conditions of captivity. Such cases set a model for others and show that fear of arrest or death is no longer a deterrent, but has become part of the cycle of direct action.
Saghar Etemad, a protester in the city of Farsan, died in a coma in hospital after being shot in the head by Islamic Republic suppressors.
These cases, combined with the urgent need for blood in Ilam and resistance to the abduction of bodies, have strengthened spontaneous networks of aid: people distribute resources directly, without government or institutional intermediaries. These practical nuclei of self-management have the potential to expand into neighborhood committees for food, defense, and information, precisely what threatens any centralized state.
The movement now encompasses over 100 locations and involves at least 22 provinces. Focus on the outskirts and major cities, where the economic crisis has hit more directly:
Tehran: Practical occupation of the east and west (Narmak, Haft-Hoz, Nazi-Abad, Tehran-Pars, Nizam-Abad, Sadeghieh, Aryashar). Street-by-street clashes, barricades and resistance even in detention.
Ilam and the west: Malekshahi remains the hotbed of violence (numerous deaths and injuries, withdrawal of forces after resistance).
Shiraz/Fars: Universities, Neyriz (entry into government buildings), Kazerun.
Isfahan: Heavy clashes, capture of special forces and direct shooting at protesters.
Other areas: Karaj, Mashhad, Kermanshah, Yasuj, Hamedan, Tabriz, Qom, Zahedan, Urmia, Lorestan (Khoram-Abad), Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad.
Deliberate dispersion has paralyzed the regime: division of forces, high costs and inability to focus repression.
Analysis of these actions:
Direct action as the main strategy: burning bases/vehicles, collective defense of hospitals, and individual resistance (as in the cases of Izeh and Narmak) demonstrate practical intelligence. These tactics not only make the cost of repression unbearable, but also create alternative structures - horizontal aid networks that can extend to local administration without a state.
Double failure of regime control: physical (retreats, capture) and psychological (transformation of killing into more anger). The regime has lost the tool of fear; mourning and arrests, instead of silencing, fuel the movement.
Real risks of deviation and opportunities: Royalist slogans or the expectation of external intervention (Trump) can threaten horizontality, by creating the illusion of new leadership or salvation from outside. The current uprising is strong because it is direct and unmediated; any attempt to organize from above destroys local initiative. The main opportunity is the expansion of neighborhood committees for the distribution of resources and a sustainable defense, which could completely dismantle central control.
The horizon ahead: the regime is on full defense. Continued dispersion and direct action could lead to the sustainable occupation of neighborhoods and the complete paralysis of the economy/movement. This is a historical moment to reject any new power (state or otherwise) and to build real horizontal relations, not to reform, not to replace, but to destroy the logic of sovereignty.
The situation is very dynamic and rapidly evolving. This uprising proves that state power is always fragile in the face of direct action from below.
It goes without saying that the protests are entering their eighth day and are still ongoing in many areas.
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